Punishment as Contract by Finkelstein, Claire Oakes
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2011 
Punishment as Contract 
Claire Oakes Finkelstein 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy 
Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Finkelstein, Claire Oakes, "Punishment as Contract" (2011). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 995. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/995 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
 
319 
Punishment as Contract 
 
 
Claire Finkelstein 
 
This paper provides a sketch of a contractarian approach to 
punishment, according to a version of contractarianism one might call 
“rational contractarianism,” by contrast with the normative 
contractarianism of John Rawls.  Rational contractarianism suggests a 
model according to which rational agents, with maximal, rather than 
minimal, knowledge of their life circumstances, would agree to the 
outlines of a particular social institution or set of social institutions 
because they view themselves as faring best in such a society governed 
by such institutions, as compared with a society governed by different 
institutional schemes available for adoption.  Applied to the institution of 
punishment, a rational contractarian approach maintains that members 
of society would reach broad agreement with one another concerning the 
outlines of a system of punishment, based on the fact that they would 
regard themselves as benefitting from the deterrent effect of such a 
system.  But they would balance the deterrence benefits of such a system 
with the incursions any scheme of punishment makes into personal 
liberty.  Rational agents would adopt that scheme of punishment that 
maximizes marginal deterrent benefit without unduly burdening 
individual liberty.   
The paper also suggests that a rational contractarian approach is 
able to capture the best insights of the two leading alternative theories of 
punishment: deterrence theory and retributivism.  On the one hand, 
rational contractarianism shares the deterrence view that the guiding 
aim of any punishment scheme must be the deterrence of crime, where a 
crime is an action that violates the background social contract.  On the 
other hand, rational contractarianism solves the central problem 
associated with pure deterrence theories—the problem that punishment on 
this view involves “using” individuals for the sake of achieving the general 
social goal of deterrence.  It does so by maintaining that the way in which 
the aim of deterrence is incorporated into punishment theory is not 
                                                                                                                                                   
   Algernon Biddle Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of 
Pennsylvania.  My thanks to Larry Crocker, Marc Fleurbaey, Jim Jacobs, Leo Katz, and David 
Velleman for their detailed and helpful comments.  I also wish to thank the members of the Criminal 
Law Theory Symposium, who discussed this Essay in their January 24, 2011 meeting, the 
participants in the Hoffinger Colloquium at New York University Law School on March 23, 2009, 
and the participants in the Penn Institute for Law and Philosophy Prioritarianism Workshop on 
January 23, 2010. 
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premised on total, or even average, social utility, but on the assent of 
each individual to the scheme by which such deterrent ends are pursued.  
The criteria for the rationality of assent for each contractor is that the 
individual regards himself as benefitting on balance from the punishment 
scheme.  A rational contractarian scheme of punishment thus renders the 
actual punishment of offenders under the rules of the system voluntary, in 
that each rational member of society has given his own prior agreement 
to be governed by the punishment institution in the event that he ends up 
committing a crime.  A voluntary punishment scheme avoids the problem 
of “using” individuals for the sake of deterring other agents, because it 
represents instead the decision of each rational contractor to allow others 
to hold him to a set of agreed upon consequences for violations of the 
social contract.  The aim of deterrence, therefore, does not cause the 
theory to “travel across persons” in the way that deterrence theories do.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Crito, Socrates discourses with a former student in his prison cell, where he 
awaits his execution.
1
  Crito has come to implore Socrates to submit to a plan to 
secure his escape from prison.
2
  Socrates, who had been tried and convicted of the 
charge of ―corrupting the minds of the young‖ of Athens,
3
 steadfastly resisted the 
option of banishment during his trial, as he believed himself innocent of the 
charges against him.  He now sees himself as bound to submit to his sentence, 
despite his equally firm conviction that it represents a miscarriage of justice.  He 
rejects all arguments to the effect that such miscarriage entitles him to evade the 
State’s verdict and violate its laws, even under threat of death.
4
 
Socrates’s argument to Crito is worth attending to, for it is not commonly 
heard in contemporary discussions of punishment.
5
  In brief, it is that he, Socrates, 
                                                                                                                                                   
1   PLATO, Crito, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 27 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington 
Cairns eds., Hugh Tredennick trans., 1961). 
2   Id. at 29.  
3   PLATO, Socrates’ Defense (Apology), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 3, 10 (Edith 
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Hugh Tredennick trans., 1961). 
4   PLATO, supra note 1, at 31–39.  
5   Two other recent philosophical articles about punishment draw on Crito as a source of 
inspiration for contemporary punishment theory.  Those articles, however, make use of the dialogue 
to underscore the existence of a right of resistance, in opposition to Socrates’s stance in Crito.  Larry 
May uses the dialogue to suggest the parameters of legitimate disobedience to legal orders.  He 
writes: ―[U]nless Socrates’s act of disobedience was intended to frustrate the end of peace in 
Athenian society, his act [of disobedience] may be justified.‖  See Larry May, Hobbes on Fidelity to 
Law, 5 HOBBES STUD. 77, 87 (1992).  Alice Ristroph uses Crito as a foil for what she advances as a 
Hobbesian view of punishment.  Contrary to Socrates’s conciliatory stance in the dialogue, Ristroph 
wishes to argue that ―[h]ad Socrates agreed to escape with Crito, Hobbesian respect would have 
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has entered into an agreement with the State to abide by its laws, in exchange for 
which he has enjoyed all the benefits of Athenian citizenship, such as begetting, 
rearing, and receiving education for his children in Athens.
6
  Admittedly, his 
consent to this agreement has been more implicit than explicit, despite his 
protestations to the contrary.
7
  But it is manifested in the fact that in his seventy 
years in Athens he has had ample opportunity to express his dissatisfaction with 
the State by quitting Athens for a different state.  By choosing to stay, he has 
manifested his acceptance of the burdens of Athenian citizenship along with its 
benefits.
8
  This argument he places in the mouth of a personified version of the 
Laws of Athens, who address him in the following terms:   
 
[A]ny Athenian, on attaining to manhood and seeing for himself the 
political organization of the state and us its laws, is permitted, if he is not 
satisfied with us, to take his property and go away wherever he likes. . . .  
On the other hand, if any one of you stands his ground when he can see 
how we administer justice and the rest of our public organization, we 
hold that by so doing he has in fact undertaken to do anything that we tell 
him.
9
 
 
From this it follows, say the Laws, ―[t]hat if you cannot persuade your 
country you must do whatever it orders, and patiently submit to any punishment 
that it imposes, whether it be flogging or imprisonment.‖
10
  The obligation to abide 
by a juridical verdict, Socrates explains, is like the duty to do military service for 
one’s country: ―Both in war and in the law courts and everywhere else you must do 
whatever your city and your country command, or else persuade them in 
accordance with universal justice . . . .‖
11
   
Why did Socrates’s conception of punishment as civic duty disappear from 
public discourse?  And why, in particular, did it fail to make an appearance in the 
punishment theory of later years?  One reason is surely that the conception of civic 
duty it advances stands in some tension with the rather more individualistic 
foundations of the contemporary ideal of citizenship.  Few modern writers would 
defend the extreme fidelity to the State’s dictates Socrates seems to be advancing.  
Socrates could have taken a more moderate position: that citizens who accept the 
                                                                                                                                                   
recognized this action as a blameless exercise in self-preservation.‖  Alice Ristroph, Respect and 
Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 628 (2009).  
6   PLATO, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
7   Id. at 37 (noting that ―there are very few people in Athens who have entered into this 
agreement . . . as explicitly as I have‖).   
8   Id. at 37–38.  
9   Id. at 36–37. 
10  Id. at 36. 
11  Id. 
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benefits of membership in the State commit themselves to abide by those verdicts 
that are just and fair, and that they are released from debt of allegiance when the 
State violates its own basic norms.  It is curious, however, that even this more 
limited version of the Socratic thesis did not make any systematic impression on 
the punishment theory of later years.
12
 
Instead, the modern debate coalesced virtually entirely around two positions: 
The retributivist theory that a person should be punished only when and to the 
extent that he deserves to suffer for the harm he has inflicted, and the utilitarian 
claim that punishment is desirable from a social perspective only insofar as its 
infliction would help deter the commission of future offenses, namely the 
deterrence theory.
13
  The former position takes perpetrators one at a time, in that it 
focuses on the moral standing of the individual perpetrator in light of his act.  The 
latter, by contrast, eclipses the individual in favor of the collective and determines 
the legitimacy of the decision to punish in terms of its social welfare effects.  As is 
well known, contemporary punishment theory has become a protracted debate 
between the perspective of individual justice assumed by retributivists and the 
perspective of social justice assumed by utilitarians.  In the process the 
contractarian perspective on which Socrates premised his argument for the civic 
virtue of punishment was eclipsed. 
The absence of any well-developed contractarian theory of punishment seems 
all the more puzzling in light of two salient facts: First, there is a robust 
contractarian tradition that emerged in seventeenth century political philosophy, 
first with the writings of Thomas Hobbes,
14
 later in the Enlightenment version of 
this same tradition in the writings of Locke
15
 and Rousseau,
16
 and finally in a 
Kantian version of the tradition, as developed by John Rawls.
17
  The absence of a 
systematic contractarian alternative to retributive and utilitarian theories of 
punishment is especially surprising in view of the breadth and depth of the 
contractarian school of thought in political theory.  There are of course hints here 
                                                                                                                                                   
12  Again, May and Ristroph have taken note of the theory, but they appear to reject its central 
claim concerning the basis for obedience to the Laws.  See supra note 5.  One possible exception lies 
in the writings on punishment by Jeffrie Murphy.  See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, 
JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 100 (1979) (―The criminal himself has no 
complaint, because he has rationally consented to or willed his own punishment.‖). 
13  For a general discussion of the distinction between deterrence justifications and retributive 
justifications, see Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Approach to Punishment, in THE BLACKWELL 
GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 207, 208–14 (Martin P. Golding & William 
A. Edmundson eds., 2005). 
14  See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1651). 
15  See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1690). 
16  See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND 
DISCOURSES (Susan Dunn ed., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1762).  
17  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
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and there as to what such an account might look like—Hobbes’s own discussion of 
punishment is all too brief, and not particularly satisfactory, but still there is a 
foundation laid.  Some in recent years have attempted to articulate a Rawlsian 
version of a contractarian theory of punishment, but such theories are more 
deontological than contractarian.
18
  The possibility of a truly contractarian 
approach to punishment is as yet substantially unexplored.  It is the hope of this 
Essay to begin to sketch the outlines of such an account.
19
 
Second, the policy questions at the heart of criminal justice debates are all 
about the proper scope of deontological values, and how these values relate to the 
sorts of utilitarian considerations the deterrence theorist advocates.  Recent 
discussions about the permissibility of torture illustrate the proposition particularly 
vividly: The debate pits the overwhelming utilitarian pressures of military 
necessity against the deontological intuition that human beings have rights and that 
these rights are not entirely extinguished by membership in a group pledged to 
destroy others.  Procedural rights, such as the presumption of innocence as well as 
doctrines like proportionality, support the suggestion that rights function as 
deontological side constraints on the treatment of even the worst criminals, a fact 
that deterrence theories cannot accommodate. 
In the Bush Administration, utilitarian thinking on this question 
predominated.
20
  President Obama had, by contrast, pledged his fidelity to the 
deontological position that, as he said in his address to Congress, ―the United 
States of America does not torture,‖
21
 though the subsequent behavior of his 
administration have made such claims hard to credit.
22
  The standoff we have seen 
in world opinion on this question bears witness to the conclusion of moral and 
legal philosophers that human rights cannot be respected if they are balanced off 
against considerations of utility, even if such considerations are marshaled for the 
sake of guarding against human rights violations of another sort.  The same can be 
said of punishment as prevention: The idea that retributive values can somehow be 
combined with, and balanced off against, utilitarian considerations pertaining to 
punishment reform is a fantasy.  All attempts at balancing collapse into a kind of 
inconsistent exchange between the rights of those suspected of crimes, on the one 
                                                                                                                                                   
18  See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 307 (2004) (using Rawlsian ideas to generate an account of punishment). 
19  I make a start in Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Argument Against the Death Penalty, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283 (2006). 
20  See Claire Finkelstein, Vindicating the Rule of Law: Prosecuting Free Riders on Human 
Rights, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 37 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010). 
21  President Barack Obama, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-
Session-of-Congress; see also Finkelstein, supra note 20.   
22  See Claire Finkelstein, Targeted Killing as a Pre-emptive Practice, in TARGETED KILLING: 
LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD (forthcoming 2012).  
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hand, and the societal urgencies that seem to require the curtailment of such rights, 
on the other.  It is the job of legal philosophers to help import clarity about the 
structure of our moral values and their degree of inviolability, with the hope that it 
will help policy makers face up to their underlying normative commitments 
squarely. 
My point of departure will be an assumption that has become standard in the 
punishment theory literature.  Because it involves the deprivation of personal 
liberty and the infliction of physical hardship, punishment is presumptively 
impermissible.
23
  The practice of punishment therefore stands in need of 
justification if the background moral objections to it are to be overridden.  
Compare this to contract law, where the justification threshold for enforcing 
contracts is much lower, given that each party to a contract has voluntarily 
undertaken to allow the other party to sue to enforce the contract should he fail to 
make good on his commitments.  Indeed, barring objectionable third-party effects, 
or paternalistic concerns, there is a presumption in favor of the enforceability of 
consensual arrangements, and hence a need to justify the refusal to enforce a 
contract.  Penalties for civil wrongs lie somewhere in between these two extremes: 
They involve a lower justificatory threshold than criminal penalties, given the 
comparatively less invasive nature of the penalty, but they are not as easy to justify 
as contractual arrangements.   
The high justificatory hurdle for our practices of punishment provides a 
reason to return to the forgotten contractarian approach to punishment: If it is 
easier to justify the enforcement of voluntary arrangements than involuntary ones, 
a theory of punishment that convincingly predicates a consensual foundation for 
the institution should depict the institution as easier to justify than other types of 
theories.  If in addition, as I have argued elsewhere,
24
 the retributive and utilitarian 
approaches to punishment have failed to meet their justificatory burdens, we have 
yet further reason to turn to an account predicated on the idea of punishment as 
consensual.  In what follows, I will first briefly summarize the reasons for my 
claim that retributivism and utilitarianism have thus far failed to provide 
                                                                                                                                                   
23  See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 1 (1986) (―It is agreed that a system of 
criminal punishment stands in need of some strenuous and persuasive justification . . . .‖); H.L.A. 
HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (2d ed. 2008).  By contrast, Mitchell Berman has recently argued that 
the standard assumption that punishment stands in need of justification is denied on at least one 
theory of punishment.  Properly understood, retributivism should be advanced as the claim that 
punishment of a guilty offender is a moral good, rather than an objectionable violation of his rights, 
and that as such it stands in need of no justification.  Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and 
Justification, 118 ETHICS 258 (2008).  Kantians seem to reject the assumption that punishment is 
presumptively impermissible because they understand punishment as requiring authorization rather 
than justification.  See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 300–24 (2009).  
24  See Finkelstein, supra note 19. 
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justifications for current criminal justice practices, and I will then attempt to sketch 
a contractarian alternative that, as I see it, is exempt from these deficiencies.   
 
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE TWO DOMINANT THEORIES 
 
There have been many critiques of both retributivism and deterrence theory 
over the years,
25
 and many responses to each of these critiques.  For present 
purposes, however, we can abbreviate what would otherwise be a lengthy 
discussion by focusing on what I would suggest constitutes the central drawback of 
each—the one that is most indicative of its deficiencies.  Start with retributivism: It 
is by now a familiar point among punishment theorists that the notion of ―desert‖ 
around which retributivism revolves is a highly ill-defined notion, one that does 
not readily lend itself to translation into a precise metric for punishment.  The 
biblical suggestion for how to understand what the notion of ―desert‖ requires is of 
course the concept of lex talionis or ―eye for eye, tooth for tooth.‖
26
  But it is hard 
to see what lex talionis entails in the face of sadistic, pleasure-seeking defendants 
like Patrick Kennedy, who brutally raped and injured his eight-year-old 
stepdaughter, leaving her near death from loss of blood.
27
  Does giving a defendant 
like Kennedy the equivalent of the suffering he inflicted on his victim mean 
turning him over to the ravages of a comparable pleasure-seeking maniac who 
happens to have a penchant for middle-aged men?  Retributivists uniformly reject 
this possibility,
28
 but they have little to put in its place. 
Furthermore, let us suppose a suitable moral equivalent for Kennedy’s crime 
can be found that is both an appropriate form of punishment and, we are confident, 
represents the subjective equivalent of the suffering his victim must have 
experienced.  Can the retributivist metric be defended in this form?  Consider an 
argument against retributivism raised by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell.
29
  Let 
us suppose, they say, that we always punish each offender exactly as much, and no 
more than, he deserves.
30
  Assuming that not every offender will be caught and 
                                                                                                                                                   
25  See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD 
BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? (2008) (pointing out the deficiencies of theories on both sides of this 
debate). 
26  Deuteronomy 19:21; Exodus 21:24; Leviticus 24:20. 
27  See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412-15 (2008). 
28  See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 25 (1992):  
[Lex talionis] cannot be thought to require that the very same action that constituted the 
offense should be visited as punishment upon the offender.  Rather, the requirement must 
be that the act of punishment be similar to the offense in certain respects.  Which respects 
these should be is a matter of normative argument. 
29  LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). 
30  Id. at 301–03.  
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punished,
31
 as is surely the case, the amount of punishment meted out in society as 
a whole would then be insufficient to achieve effective deterrence.  Why?  
Assume, as a rough approximation, that the rational criminal would be deterred by 
receiving somewhat more, by way of punishment, than the suffering he inflicted on 
his victim.  If he can discount the gravity of the threatened punishment by the 
thirty, forty or fifty percent chance he will not actually be caught, he will have 
inadequate incentive to refrain from committing such offenses and will not be 
deterred.
32
   
At first blush, Kaplow and Shavell’s point is compelling.  If we assume an 
offender’s deserved punishment to be a rough match for the level of punishment 
that would deter him, then it is true that less than perfect detection would bring the 
effective punishment to less than the deterrent level.  But why on earth should we 
assume this?  Why assume that the utility a rational criminal receives from 
committing a crime is equal in value to the disutility he inflicted on this victim?  
Nevertheless, it is this assumption on which Kaplow and Shavell rely to connect 
―desert‖ with deterrence, as desert is tied to the victim’s disutility, in their model, 
and deterrence is a function of the criminal’s.
33
  Since the connection between the 
criminal’s utility and the victim’s disutility is unwarranted, however, their point 
about the relation between desert and deterrence is as well. 
One reason for focusing on Kaplow and Shavell’s arguments in favor of 
deterrence theory, despite the obvious difficulties with the account, is that it helps 
to underscore the degree to which considerations of desert have nothing to do with 
deterrence.  Thus if one adopts a desert-based approach to punishment, there is no 
guarantee that we will set punishment at levels designed for optimal deterrence.  
And this implies that retributivists who insist on the desert criterion for punishment 
will be forced to accept the inappropriateness of the goal of deterrence.  Indeed, as 
we saw earlier with the example of torture, their wholesale rejection of deterrence 
as a social goal must be so thorough that they cannot even count the goal of 
reducing the number of wrongful acts in society as one legitimate goal among 
others.  As Kaplow and Shavell put the point: ―[B]ecause retributivists ignore 
deterrence and thus changes in the number of wrongful acts that are committed, 
they by the same token ignore changes in the number of occasions on which 
wrongdoers unfairly go free.‖
34
  The point, they insist, is that ―retributive notions 
of fairness are associated with indifference to the number of instances of unfair 
treatment.‖
35
  And they suggest that this ―is in tension with the demand of 
retributive justice that fair punishment be imposed on everyone who commits a 
                                                                                                                                                   
31  Id. at 309.   
32  Id. at 311–13. 
33  Id. at 292–93. 
34  Id. at 313. 
35  Id. 
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wrongful act.‖
36
  Retributivism thus appears internally inconsistent: If retributivists 
truly care about rights violations, they should want to minimize the occasions on 
which rights are violated across society, and that means seeking to deter such 
violations through an effective scheme of incentives that operates by making an 
example of current offenders.  But since retributivists cannot consistently posit 
deterrence of anything as a goal of the theory, pure retributivism is a failure. 
Retributivists would reject the suggestion of internal inconsistency for they 
would say that corrective justice is not aggregative—it is governed by case-by-case 
considerations.  So the fact that retributivists do not regard it as justified to seek to 
minimize the number of rights violations by deterring future violations does not 
stand in tension with their rejection of the legitimacy of violations of rights.  This 
is the sense in which retributivism is ineliminably deontological: Even if punishing 
an offender more than he deserves would help to reduce the chances that victims 
would have their rights violated in the future in ways that they do not deserve, such 
a basis for punishment remains impermissible.  But unfortunately, this response, 
which shows that the retributivist has the courage of his convictions, does not 
serve to vindicate the theory.  For if retributive theory cannot, by its own 
admission, accommodate the social goal of minimizing the number of rights-
violations in society, the theory is fundamentally ill-equipped to provide guidance 
on important matters of criminal justice policy. 
Because they do not seem aware of any options other than deterrence or 
retribution, it is not surprising that Kaplow and Shavell regard this negative 
argument as largely clinching the case for deterrence-based accounts in some form.  
Presumably for this reason they do not feel the need to address the significant 
weaknesses of deterrence-based accounts.  But such weaknesses are not far to seek.  
Let us turn, then, to deterrence theories to give them their just deserts. 
Begin with a small, though fundamental, problem the deterrence theorist 
faces.  Let us return to the erroneous point made by Kaplow and Shavell, namely 
that the pain inflicted on the victim is equivalent to the pleasure or benefit the 
criminal receives from committing his crime.  This error in thinking, which turned 
out not to be problematic for the retributivist after all, will pose problems for the 
deterrence theorist.  Since deterrence operates on the incentives of the perpetrator, 
rather than on the harm inflicted on the victim, deterrence theory is ineliminably 
tied to a factor that has little to do with the social harm criminal activity imposes.  
Matters are of course significantly different in the standard economic account of 
tort law, where the undesirability of the conduct we are seeking to deter is entirely 
a function of the harm it inflicts.  In this context, it is plausible to set liability levels 
by forcing potential tortfeasors to internalize the costs of their activities, thereby 
creating incentives to induce tortfeasors to desist from, or take precautions against, 
incidental harm that results from productive activities in which they are engaged.
37
  
                                                                                                                                                   
36  Id. 
37  See id. at 85–154. 
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We would therefore have no reason, in at least the standard case in tort law, to 
establish a scheme of deterrence that was not tailored to the harmfulness of the 
underlying activity.  But in criminal law, the wrongness of the activity is defined 
separately from the harm it produces, or the pain it inflicts on its victim, and hence 
the aim of deterrence cannot be measured by the harmfulness of the conduct.
38
 
In criminal law, we have a list of conduct that is judged to be per se 
undesirable, and for which the optimal activity level is effectively zero.
39
  And this 
means that since we know we want to eliminate as much of this conduct as 
possible, within the bounds of our allowable resources for crime prevention, our 
interest in deterrence narrows our focus exclusively to the incentives to the 
criminal, forgetting all other concerns, such as the level of harm associated with 
the activity.  But since crimes that bring great benefit to the perpetrator will require 
heavier penalties to deter effectively than crimes that bring little benefit or pleasure 
to the perpetrator, it follows that crimes that cause relatively little harm to the 
victim may actually require higher penalties than crimes that cause great pain and 
suffering.  We would have to punish theft more severely than homicide, for 
example, if it turned out that the gains to criminals from theft were significantly 
higher than the gains from homicide.  The moral severity of the offense simply 
does not play a role in determining the appropriate level of punishment in a 
deterrence account.  The deterrence theory of punishment is thus potentially out of 
sync with rather deeply-felt intuitions about the gravity of harm and hence about 
appropriate social treatment of offenses. 
Second, deterrence theorists to date have no adequate response to the kind of 
argument that is typically leveled against them by retributivists, namely the 
standard objections of deontologists to utilitarian theories.
40
  Retributivists object 
to the fact that deterrence theorists seek to justify the punishment of one person in 
terms of the effect such punishment would have on a wholly different, uninvolved 
other person at some point in the future.  This objection has taken many guises 
over the years.  Retributivists say that deterrence theorists are committed to the 
proposition that it would be permissible to punish one person to deter a larger 
number of other people from committing crimes, even if the one was not himself 
guilty of committing any crime.  They thus cannot justify restricting punishment to 
                                                                                                                                                   
38  See Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 333 (2002). 
39  There is of course debate about this in economic writings on criminal law.  Gary Becker’s 
famous insight was that because achieving zero activity levels would require a level of resource 
allocation to law enforcement that would be sub-optimal, we can say that there is a ―desirable,‖ non-
zero activity level for every crime.  This model effectively brings the theory of criminal deterrence 
closer to the standard economic account of tort law.  But the reason for favoring non-zero activity 
levels is of course significantly different in the two accounts, and Becker is not asserting that a non-
zero level of criminal activity is desirable in and of itself, in the absence of resource considerations.  
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
40  See Finkelstein, supra note 19. 
2011] PUNISHMENT AS CONTRACT 329 
 
the guilty.  Alternatively retributivists point out that deterrence theorists are unable 
to account for any requirement of proportionality even as against guilty offenders, 
as disproportionate punishment may be required for optimal deterrence.  (This in 
effect was the point I made against Kaplow and Shavell earlier.)  Finally, 
retributivists sometimes argue that even if deterrence theory could limit 
punishment to the guilty, and even if it could somehow insist on penalties that 
were proportionate to that guilt, deterrence is still morally unacceptable because it 
amounts to using offenders for the sake of the achievement of social welfare goals, 
and this fails to respect their humanity.  This basic objection I have put elsewhere 
in terms of the judgments of responsibility that are implicit in the deterrence 
theorists’ approach to punishment: Deterrence, as standardly argued for, is a 
justification for punishment that travels across persons, since it purports to hold 
one agent responsible in order to deter future acts of responsibility of other agents, 
and as such conflicts with fundamental intuitions of fairness to which our criminal 
justice system is committed.
41
   
Furthermore, and most relevant from the standpoint of the contractarian 
approach we will consider shortly, deterrence arguments do not take a form that 
the offender himself would likely regard as providing a justification for his 
punishment.  After all, he might argue, he surely has a right to be punished in light 
of considerations that pertain to his act alone, whatever form such considerations 
ultimately take.  The various attempts deterrence theorists have made to 
accommodate the deontological concerns—such as that deterrence will not work if 
it is not fundamentally tailored towards guilty offenders or is significantly out of 
keeping with retributive intuitions, and so forth—seem largely to miss the mark, as 
they fail to answer the demand for individualized justification that an offender may 
rightly have.  Yet once again, the need to justify the treatment of an offender to 
that offender in terms that are particular to that person’s situation—and the fact 
that retributivism can meet that demand far better than deterrence theories—does 
not clinch the case for retributivism any more than the inability to accommodate 
the most basic needs of crime control policy clinches the case for deterrence 
theory. 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that neither retributivism nor deterrence 
theory is ultimately equipped to justify the practice of punishment in something 
resembling its current form.  Each requires the suppression of strongly-felt 
intuitions that only the other seems able to accommodate, and yet the history of 
efforts to marry retributive and utilitarian considerations in a mixed theory of 
punishment have been equally unsuccessful, as they must give primacy to one 
rationale for punishment or the other, and as such remain subject to the 
fundamental objections to each.
42
  Once we understand that a justification for 
                                                                                                                                                   
41  See id. at 1299. 
42  For a mixed theory of punishment, see H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2d ed. 2008).  Hart argues that while deterrence is the ―General 
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punishment must be able to combine the need for social control, on the one hand, 
with providing an offender with a justification for his treatment that he himself can 
recognize as legitimate and that neither standard rationale for punishment can 
accomplish this, the search for an entirely different sort of account of punishment 
becomes compelling. 
 
III. TOWARDS A CONTRACTARIAN APPROACH TO PUNISHMENT 
 
To summarize the argument thus far: I have argued, against retributivists, that 
a theory of punishment that gives no weight to considerations of deterrence is 
unable to serve as a guide for actual questions of criminal justice reform.  And I 
have argued, against utilitarians, that a theory that is unable to provide an 
individualized justification to the criminal for his punishment and instead seeks to 
justify his treatment by its effects on another agent is morally unacceptable.  The 
contractarian approach to punishment holds out the hope of a conjoined solution to 
these problems: It combines the social aim of deterrence with an individualized 
approach to the justification for imposing punishment on a particular agent, thus 
providing the criminal with an argument for his own punishment that he can 
accept, at the same time that it establishes a realistic basis for institutional 
planning.  We will now consider in detail how a contractarian theory might 
accomplish these aims. 
The prospect for a more adequate theory of punishment lies largely in the 
contractarian’s insistence that punishment be voluntarily imposed.  Assume that a 
given punishment scheme has at least moderately strong deterrent efficacy.  A 
rational contractor would agree to live in a regime that furnishes this level of 
deterrence to serious crimes, and hence would prefer it to one in which such 
deterrence is absent.  As the justificatory burden for consensual arrangements is 
particularly low, it should be easier to justify the infliction of punishment on such 
an account than on any other.
43
 
I am not arguing that a consensual approach to punishment can justify the 
infliction of punishment merely by reference to the idea, if true, that citizens have 
consented to the scheme of punishment under which they must live.  Consent 
                                                                                                                                                   
Justifying Aim‖ of punishment, id. at 8, the legitimate pursuit of deterrence must be limited by more 
general moral constraints, such as constraints on punishing the innocent as well as principles of 
proportionality.  See id. at 1–27.  The problem is that it is unclear what the relationship is between the 
general justifying aim of punishment and the foregoing retributive side-constraints, a problem that 
afflicts mixed theories generally.  In more recent writings, Paul Robinson advances a mixed theory of 
punishment, according to which punishment should be distributed according to the empirical beliefs 
the general public has about desert.  But the ultimate justification for a principle that distributes 
punishment according to public opinion about desert is that distributing punishment in this way has 
important crime control consequences.  The theory thus appears to be more of a straight forward 
deterrence account than a truly mixed theory.  See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 25, at 135–74.   
43  See C.S. Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 289 (1983). 
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considered by itself does not have such normative force, as is reflected in the fact 
that the criminal law rejects consent as a defense to most crimes, most notably to 
murder.  Although consent is a defense to some crimes, such as rape and battery, it 
is limited in its operation even in these cases to situations in which the victim does 
not suffer harm.  A consensual theory of punishment, then, must be prepared to 
explain the relevance of consent to its account of the justifiability of punishment.  
As Socrates suggested in his argument to Crito, it is not consent alone that justifies 
punishment, but consent premised on the benefit the citizen who consents to abide 
by the State’s dictates takes himself to be receiving in the bargain.
44
  Thus while 
neither benefit from a scheme of punishment nor consent to its terms would be 
sufficient by itself to justify the imposition of punishment on a particular offender, 
the combination of benefit and consent may be a different matter. 
It might be thought that a contractarian approach only mirrors the basic 
utilitarian account inside the structure of a social agreement.  But this impression 
would be incorrect.  A utilitarian social agreement, such as Harsanyi might have 
recommended, would discount the costs and benefits of a deterrence scheme.
45
  
Contractors in this sort of world would merely ask whether they could expect to 
fare better under a system of deterrence than without it, taking into account the 
expected benefits of such a system and discounting them by the expected costs.  
Agreement in the contractarian tradition, by contrast, produces different results, for 
it is subject to several critical assumptions: 
1. Rational contractarians assume that human beings are rational in the 
sense that they are primarily interested in maximizing their welfare and 
their preferences are generally not other-regarding. 
2. They assume that each has knowledge of each other’s rationality and, 
further, that each has knowledge of each other’s knowledge of his 
rationality.  This is the so-called ―common knowledge‖ assumption.
46
 
3. They assume that although rational, human beings are highly risk-averse 
when it comes to fundamental aspects of their welfare.  With regard to 
institutions that apply to what Rawls would call the ―basic structure of 
society,‖
47
 they would seek to assure themselves of faring better in their 
post-agreement condition than they did according to their pre-agreement 
baseline.  I shall refer to this as the ―benefit requirement.‖
48
  
                                                                                                                                                   
44  See PLATO, supra note 1, at 36–37. 
45  See John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM 
AND BEYOND 39 (Armartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
46  See, e.g., Edward McClennen, The Theory of Rationality for Ideal Games, 65 PHIL. STUD. 
193, 193 (1992). 
47  RAWLS, supra note 17, at 6–7. 
48  See my early discussion of this condition in Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 1316–24. 
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4. While the contractors do not operate behind a thick veil of ignorance, as 
in Rawls’s theory,
49
 they remain agnostic about their future choices.  
That is, in interpreting the benefit requirement, they seek assurances that 
they will benefit under any future life circumstance or choice they might 
make.  They seek, in other words, an assurance of benefit for the worst 
case scenario under any rule proposed for an agreement that pertains to 
the basic structure.   
5. They assume that any agreement pertaining to the basic structure must be 
unanimous and universal, meaning that consent must be unanimous and 
that benefit must be universal in order for our institution of punishment 
to be both voluntary and welfare enhancing.   
One effect of these conditions is that the social goal of deterrence performs a 
function it could not in a utilitarian account: It is able to dictate specific parameters 
for the punishment of each separate crime.  In this way, the notion of deterrence 
can be made to generate normative constraints on punishment.  The inability to do 
this was the central weakness of deterrence theory we considered previously. 
Now let us consider how the contractarian approach would fare in application 
to a specific decision regarding punishment.  Consider a group of contractors 
trying to decide how much and what kind of protection they should institute for 
private property.  They have already selected a series of rules establishing a system 
of ownership, and they now seek a means of enforcement.  They must weigh the 
following considerations.  On the one hand, they would like the maximum 
deterrence feasible for violations of ownership rights.  On the other hand, they also 
want to protect their personal freedom and would like to maximize independence 
of choice without interference from others.  Maximizing independence of choice 
would leave no protection for ownership, while maximizing protection for private 
property would sharply curtail personal liberty. 
In balancing security and liberty, each person asks himself: Would I be better 
off in a society that established penalties for theft and other violations of property 
norms than I am at my current baseline welfare?  In answering this question, and 
applying our assumptions, each agent would weigh the benefit he would receive 
from increased deterrence against the loss he would suffer in the worst case 
scenario—that is, the balance of gains and losses he would experience in the worst 
case scenario under the rule.  The worst case scenario is clearly the case in which 
the agent has little property to protect and is most disadvantaged by the rule, and 
this would be the case in which he is the object of the increased penalty himself.  
Thus he must ask whether he would be advantaged on balance from penalties for 
theft in a world in which he was himself subject to such penalties, as compared, for 
example, with a baseline in which there was no protection for private ownership at 
all.  If the penalties for theft are set too low, the deterrent effect will be 
insignificant and private property will not be protected.  If the penalties are too 
                                                                                                                                                   
49  RAWLS, supra note 17, at 118–23. 
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high, agents receiving the penalty would be worse off than they would be in the 
absence of private property and the benefit requirement would not be satisfied.   
To be more specific, imagine how parties to an original social contract would 
reason about a proposed penalty—for example, a twenty-year sentence for grand 
larceny.  For the sake of argument, let us suppose this reasoning takes place not in 
a state of nature but against the backdrop of an existing, but constantly evolving, 
regime.  And let us imagine each person can place a precise value on the totality of 
his personal possessions.  Suppose further that under the current regime, which 
allows a maximum sentence for such thefts of ten years, each person can fairly 
well estimate the likelihood of theft over a certain fixed period of time.  Now 
imagine that the proposed change in the maximum for such sentences doubles—it 
moves from ten to twenty years.  In this case, we would expect the overall 
probability of theft would be cut in half. 
Standard economic or utilitarian approaches to deterrence calculations would 
now regard the case for increasing the penalty for theft from ten to twenty years as 
nearly made, with several possible caveats: First, increasing the penalty for theft 
could have an undesirable effect on the incentives potential offenders have to 
commit other crimes.  For example, if the penalty for bicycle theft is significantly 
increased, that would reduce the differential between the penalty for bicycle theft 
and the penalty for auto theft, with the result that some offenders inclined to steal 
bicycles might now steal automobiles.  Similarly, as Justice Kennedy has recently 
written in Kennedy v. Louisiana, increasing the penalty for rape to death would 
decrease the disincentives to murder the victims of rape.
50
  Second, deterrence 
theorists are forced to evaluate the benefits of the enhanced deterrent effect in light 
of the total economy of costs and benefits such a change would entail.  If the cost 
to the State of imposing the increased penalty is also increased, then the marginal 
social benefit of the additional penalty might not ultimately be positive.  The 
utilitarian case for adopting such a penalty, then, would be subject to the 
requirement that the benefits of increased deterrence are worth the costs. 
One point that this discussion underlines is that deterrence in a utilitarian 
theory does not provide a justification that is addressed to individual offenders, as 
there need be nothing in it for them, even in the ex-ante sense.  For this version of 
deterrence theory requires neither that each individual member of society regard 
himself as benefited nor that individual members of society consent to the 
deterrence scheme under which they are protected.  While the traditional appeal to 
deterrence does restrict enhancements in punishment to instances where social 
welfare will increase in the aggregate, that social benefit may turn out to be 
unevenly distributed and hence may improve the lot of the few at the cost of the 
many.  The benefit requirement suggests that rational contractors would reject any 
such gamble. 
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Accordingly, on a contractarian approach, a member of the putative 
punishment agreement would consider whether he could expect to benefit under 
the worst case scenario, namely the case in which he himself ends up subject to the 
penalty.  Now, in addition to considering the benefits of the additional deterrence 
under the increased sentence for theft, a social contractor must weigh the value to 
him of that increased protection for property against the disvalue he would 
experience from an additional ten years in prison.  Because the odds of loss of 
property are relatively low, against the background of a ten-year sentence, the 
marginal increase in deterrent efficacy in our example is unlikely to outweigh the 
significant loss in value the rational agent would attach to an additional ten-year 
loss of liberty.  Hence, the benefit test would most likely not be satisfied. 
We might compare the marginal increase in penalty just considered to a 
different kind of decision, namely the decision whether to punish theft at all.  If our 
contractors start from a baseline of zero punishment for theft and consider the 
adoption of a ten-year sentence for that crime, they would likely reach a different 
conclusion.  For the cost of failing to adopt the contemplated penalty is now very 
high: assuming there were no other penalties to protect the interest individuals 
have in their property, the absence of the ten-year penalty would mean that all 
property was insecure.  Contractors who have already settled on a scheme of 
distribution in their basic social contract would now have no way of enforcing that 
agreement.  They would in effect be living in a property-less regime.  Against this 
background, the increased deterrent benefit in moving from a regime with a ten-
year sentence for theft would prove a benefit to every member of society, even 
those to whom this penalty is later applied.  In response to the question, ―In light of 
what is my punishment justified?‖ we can say to the offender: ―Your punishment is 
justified because the benefits of a deterrent scheme that enabled you to protect 
your property have been great enough to you, throughout your life, that they 
overwhelm even the disvalue you are presently experiencing from your ten-year 
sentence.  Your life is still better than it would have been in the absence of that 
sentencing provision, despite the fact that it has resulted in your incarceration.‖  
The benefit, in short, is not just to society generally: It is one that attaches to each 
particular offender and supplies each with a ground for consenting to the deterrent 
scheme under which he is to be punished. 
One will now be tempted to object as follows: The only reason the ten-year 
sentence turned out to be justified, on the account I have proposed, is that we 
started from a baseline of zero punishment.  But surely if we start from a baseline 
of zero punishment, the twenty-year sentence would appear justified as well.  We 
would accept any penalty as legitimate for a serious crime like theft rather than live 
with conditions of zero deterrence.  But once we start at a different, higher 
baseline, no penalty will seem justified.  So the account either makes punishment 
too easy to justify or too hard: It is too easy if the alternative is no punishment, and 
it is too hard if any alternative to a zero level of punishment is available. 
But I do not think this critique is ultimately correct, though I concede the 
critical importance of specifying for social contractors the baseline from which 
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they bargain.  Suppose we start with a baseline of zero punishment and instead of 
considering only one option, our rational contractors consider two: they consider 
adopting either a mandatory ten-year sentence or, alternatively, the death penalty.  
Under these circumstances, rational contractors would unhesitatingly choose the 
ten-year sentence.  Why?  With a ten-year sentence we can assume that the 
chances that an individual contractor would lose his property to theft would be 
relatively low.  Deterrence at this level of punishment, in other words, is fairly 
effective.  Suppose, however, that if the contractors adopted the death penalty their 
risk of losing their property would be reduced to zero.  Still, the increase in 
disutility to a rational contractor of the difference between a penalty of ten years 
and being put to death is so extreme that the rather small deterrent benefit he 
experienced would not seem worth the added cost to him.  So even against the 
background of zero punishment, not every penalty will turn out to be justified. 
Would a penalty like death ever be justified by this method?  It is unlikely that 
rational contractors would accept the death penalty, even in the absence of any 
alternative sanctions.  Rational agents simply do not regard losing their lives for 
the sake of protecting their property as a trade-off worth making.  But arguably 
matters would be different if individuals were asked to consider a roster of possible 
penalties for murder.  Since the value they place on their lives is much greater than 
the value they place on their property, rational contractors might consider death a 
sensible price to pay for lengthening their own earlier lives.
51
 
Thus in a world in which no penalties were available other than death, the 
death penalty might be selected by the contractors in an initial position of choice.  
In that case, the alternative to having any punishment for murder would be the 
worst sort of violent state of nature, one that, if Hobbes is to be believed, would be 
so brutal and insecure that no one could expect to survive into old age.
52
  Relative 
to the state of nature, even the person condemned to die would regard himself as 
benefited, given the horror of his life in the absence of such penalties.  If, however, 
the contractors faced a choice of a mandatory life sentence or death for murder, 
they would evaluate things differently.  The question they would ask themselves in 
this case would be: Does the marginal increase in personal security from the death 
penalty, as compared with a mandatory life sentence, deter murder so much that it 
outweighs the marginal loss of personal security a person subject to that penalty 
would suffer?  Here we can see that even in the unlikely event that each 
application of the death penalty deterred eight additional murders, as compared 
with life in prison without parole, the marginal value of that added deterrence 
would likely be outweighed by the marginal cost of the death penalty to an 
individual contractor.  Weighing this likely effect in advance, the contractors 
would reject the death penalty.  This conclusion replicates the results of actual jury 
sentences with the increasing availability of life without parole as an alternative to 
                                                                                                                                                   
51  See Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 1319–24. 
52  See HOBBES, supra note 14, at 186. 
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death.  In the states in which life without parole is made routinely available, the 
willingness of juries to assign the death penalty has been substantially 
diminished.
53
 
Notice the advantages of rational contractarianism as compared with the two 
leading approaches to punishment.  On the one hand, rational contractarianism 
solves the central problem associated with pure deterrence theories—the problem 
that punishment on this view involves traveling across persons.  It is true that 
according to rational contractarianism, deterrence is the basic aim of the 
punishment agreement, and deterrence schemes usually involve traveling across 
persons.  But the problem does not arise on this view, for although the institution 
of punishment would be deterrence-based, and hence would hold one person 
responsible for the acts of another, each individual punished would have agreed to 
these conditions with respect to his own future violations of the covenant.  Each 
member of the social contract pledges his fidelity and offers his willingness to 
submit to punishment should he fail to make good on his promise.  Since he offers 
this guarantee in order to induce his fellows to contract with him, he in effect 
furthers his defensive interests in doing so.  There is thus no conflict with the 
rights of self-defense he so carefully safeguards and no sacrifice of individual 
welfare.  The contractarian account is able to incorporate deterrence as a social 
goal of paramount importance, but as this goal is given an individual interpretation, 
the usual objections fail to apply. 
On the other hand, the contractarian theory we have explored captures the 
greatest strength of the retributive principle by establishing a kind of moral 
equivalence between crime and punishment.  The benefit requirement demands 
that each contractor consider both what he gains from protecting the interest in 
question and what he would suffer if punished.  Since the importance of the 
underlying institution establishes the gravity of the violation for which punishment 
is contemplated, the benefit requirement creates a metric for matching offenses 
with penalties.  Moreover, it does so without making the retributive theory’s 
mistake of rejecting deterrence as a legitimate aim of punishment.  It is this feature 
of retributive theories that presumably relegates them to a world of high theory, 
since the notion of desert is ill-equipped to provide a foundation for rational 
policy-making in the area of criminal justice.
54
 
                                                                                                                                                   
53  See Richard C. Dieter, Sentencing for Life: Americans Embrace Alternatives to the Death 
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (April 1993), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/sentencing-life-americans-embrace-alternatives-death-penalty:  
Although a majority of those interviewed said they favored capital punishment abstractly, 
that support is reversed when the sentence of life without parole, coupled with a 
requirement of restitution, is offered as an alternative.  Forty-four percent favor that 
alternative, while only 41% selected the death penalty.  Even the choice of a sentence 
which guaranteed restitution and no release for at least 25 years caused death penalty 
support to drop by 33%. 
54  I raise other objections to retributivism in Finkelstein, supra note 13, at 214–18. 
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IV. OBJECTIONS 
 
There are several objections to the argument I offered in the preceding 
section, and I shall consider these in the remainder of this Essay.  First, a 
significant objection to my argument is that a person has a choice over whether to 
commit a crime and thus whether he risks suffering the death penalty or any other 
penalty is under his control.  If this is true, a rational agent would opt for the most 
stringent penalties for all sorts of crimes as long as stringent penalties are cost-
justified in a social sense.  For he can thus capture the up-side of stringent 
deterrence and reject the down-side by simply avoiding the worst case scenario on 
his own.  In this way he would maximize his net anticipated security, since he 
would benefit from the deterrent effects of the harsh penalties but could be sure 
that he would never end up subject to them.  This objection, then, rejects my fourth 
assumption, namely that rational agents would reason from the worst case 
scenario, including scenarios that are the product of choice.
55
 
I would argue, however, that rational contractors may still want to guard 
against excessive penalties in case they are not deterred.
56
  Rational individuals are 
likely to allow for the possibility that they may feel the need to commit a crime in 
the future, and so they may choose to limit the severity of societal responses to it.  
We only need imagine that it might be to an agent’s benefit to commit a crime, 
despite the fact that the agent also views it as beneficial ex ante to make that act a 
crime.  If so, the rational agent might wish to preserve his ability to commit that 
crime and so would not agree to the harshest penalties in deciding ex ante how 
much punishment it deserves.  And he might wish to preserve this option, even 
though he is aware that preserving the option for himself would preserve that same 
option for everyone else.  
One way to understand this seemingly odd suggestion is to notice that rational 
agents would eschew social rules that severely restrict or limit their freedom of 
choice to the extent it is feasible for them to do so.  That is, their desire to deter 
crime must always be balanced against a countervailing desire to protect the range 
of choices available to them.  If, for example, the death penalty purchases only a 
marginal increase in deterrence at the cost of a substantial increase in the coercive 
                                                                                                                                                   
55  Furthermore, the agent might actually be pleased with the deterrent effect on himself, since 
the higher the penalties for crime, the less likely he would be to commit a crime.  Presumably he has 
a current preference that he not commit crimes in the future.  If, by contrast, the penalties for a given 
crime are too low, he loses both the deterrent benefit with regard to others and increases the 
likelihood that he himself will commit a crime that will make him subject to the penalty.  And this 
might suggest that rational contractors would not set any limits on the penalties they saw it as rational 
to adopt.  I am indebted to Dan Markel for this point. 
56  It is of course possible that a person could be subject to a penalty punishment without 
having committed a crime at all.  I have assumed throughout that punishments could be administered 
flawlessly.  Relax that assumption by allowing even a small chance of error and contractors applying 
the benefit requirement will have an obvious reason to reject harsh penalties.   
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powers of the State, it would be rational to reject it.  Because the particular identity 
of the crimes to which the death penalty would be applied remains subject to 
change, individuals cannot ensure that they are able to protect their freedom where 
they would most wish for it.  Limiting the severity of the punishments that can be 
inflicted for the most severe crimes is thus a way to blunt the force of undesirable 
liberty restrictions. 
Here is yet another way to put the point: On a contractarian theory, it is 
rational to establish a strong system of rights to bodily integrity, rights that cannot 
be derogated from in specific cases for the sake of short-term gains.  While future 
members of society might regard themselves as benefiting from a contract in which 
others agree to subject themselves to the harsh penalties on the condition that every 
other member of society is willing to do the same, such an agreement would 
conflict with the broader principles of protection for bodily integrity and 
enforcement of defensive rights that rational members of society would be 
concerned to establish.  The same, by contrast, need not be said of agreements to 
be subject to deprivations of liberty.  Incarceration leaves the body intact and one’s 
natural life extended.  It allows for the continuation of plans and projects of at least 
a rudimentary sort and does not foreclose challenging one’s conviction and per-
haps regaining one’s liberty.  It also allows for the possibility of compensation 
with future benefits, whether through advancement of personal projects or the 
bestowing of various pleasures. 
A related objection has to do with the scope of the individuals that should be 
included in the initial agreement.  On traditional contractarian approaches, those 
who violate the terms of the contract are thereafter totally excluded from it.
57
  On 
such a view, the contract itself imposes no limitations on what it is acceptable to do 
to violators.  Locke, for example, argues that those who violate the terms of the 
contract are like wild beasts; they can be hunted down and killed 
indiscriminately.
58
  And, according to Rousseau, ―every evildoer who attacks 
social rights becomes by his crimes a rebel and a traitor to his country; by violating 
its laws he ceases to be a member of it.‖
59
  The present objection is just a version 
of that idea, namely that the contract ought not to include those who are violators 
or free riders, and so we are entitled to treat such individuals in any way we see fit.  
From a certain perspective, the point is quite defensible.  If society is ―a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage,‖
60
 it makes sense to think of criminals 
as outside the scope of all voluntary arrangements, since cooperating with them 
                                                                                                                                                   
57  For a discussion of the contractarian approach to violators’ loss of contractual rights, see 
Christopher W. Morris, Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing, 21 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 53, 62–65 
(1991). 
58  See LOCKE, supra note 15, at 279 (―[O]ne may destroy a Man who makes War upon him, or 
has discovered an Enmity to his being, for the same Reason, that he may kill a Wolf or a Lyon.‖). 
59  ROUSSEAU, supra note 16, at 177. 
60  RAWLS, supra note 17, at 4. 
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would not be to the advantage of those who remain faithful to their terms.  
Moreover, it arguably makes no sense to include the treatment of contract violators 
within the terms of the contract itself, since that seems to suppose that we are 
taking into account the perspective of those who intend not to abide by the terms of 
our initial contract regarding the basic structure. 
But despite these merits, I think the traditional approach to contract violators 
should be rejected.  For while it is true that the initial contract is made only among 
those who accept the conditions of cooperation, cooperators can become defectors 
at any point after all have agreed to the contract’s terms.  It is therefore incorrect to 
equate defection with non-cooperation at the outset.
61
  Several additional con-
siderations support this approach.  First, defections can be large or small, and it 
may be that it is still advantageous to cooperate with those who defect, as long as 
their defections are sufficiently minor.  Second, it is not possible to address the 
problem of non-cooperation at the outset in any way other than by refusing to 
contract.  But defectors are themselves subject to the terms of an antecedent 
agreement and can therefore be dealt with contractually. 
A final argument against the traditional approach to violators is that it simply 
seems wrong to think of a defector as beyond the bounds of all social interaction, 
someone who deserves none of the protections or entitlements that those who enter 
into rational relations with others receive.  We do not normally think of even the 
most heinous violations as depriving their perpetrators of basic dignitary rights, 
such as the right to be free from torture, the right to speak in one’s own defense, 
and the right to appropriate levels of bodily dignity and comfort.  It is true that 
non-rational creatures are often thought of as possessing a subset of these same 
rights, and we cannot think of them as parties to a social contract.  This suggests a 
basis for assigning rights to biological agents outside the contractual context.  But 
the protections afforded such creatures are thought to be significantly weaker than 
those extended to even the worst criminals.  For these and other reasons, the 
conditions under which human beings may permissibly inflict sanctions for non-
cooperation on members of their own kind should be thought of as governed by an 
antecedent agreement they make to enforce the terms of cooperative interaction. 
Only by including potential violators in the social contract can the 
contractarian model provide any practical guidance to a theory of punishment.  
This allows us to capture within a contractarian framework the basic deontological 
intuitions that made retributivism seem initially attractive.  As we have seen, these 
deontological intuitions are insufficient in and of themselves to produce a theory of 
punishment directly.  It is only when combined with the aim of deterrence that they 
find their proper place.  Normally, the aim of deterrence and intuitions concerning 
desert cannot coexist in a theory of punishment.  In the contractarian approach we 
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have explored, however, these elements complement each other without 
contradiction. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Let us return briefly to Socrates and recall in particular his suggestion that 
fidelity to the commitment one has made to obey the laws constitutes a civic duty, 
something akin to military service or jury duty.
62
  We now are in a position to put 
some flesh on the bones of this suggestion.  In a more developed version of the 
contractarian suggestion, the duty to abide by the terms of one’s punishment is a 
duty owed not to the State, but to one’s fellow contractors, to whom one has 
pledged one’s commitment to the terms of the contract.  As Hobbes makes clear, 
those who would violate the contract are free-riders on the welfare of others, and 
no rational agent, knowing them to be such, would have agreed to contract with 
them in the first place.
63
  We now, however, have a basis for understanding why 
Socrates’s version of the civic duty to undergo punishment is more extreme than 
need be.  If the duty to abide by the State’s dictates is a duty owed to one’s fellows, 
that duty need not be absolute.  For there are rare times when it works to the 
advantage of all to disregard those dictates, as when the State has overstepped the 
authorization that rational agents saw it as in their interest to give.  Such rejection 
of the State’s dictates might be full or partial: A full-scale rejection would be 
warranted when the State no longer seeks to justify its authority to an entire 
segment of the population that authorized its power over them.  Such might have 
been the case in Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Russia.  The grounds for a partial 
rejection we have seen in our own times: When the government consistently and 
repeatedly demands action in the name of public benefit that benefits few and 
injures many, once again it has flouted the conditions of its original grant of 
authority, and its power over its subjects can, with right, be rejected. 
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